The myth of food production "efficiency" in the "ar" debate

On Jul 30, 7:27 am, Dutch <n....TakeThisOut@email.com> wrote:
> Rupert wrote:
> > On Jul 5, 7:21 pm, "Dutch" <n....TakeThisOut@home.com> wrote:
>
> {..]
>
>
>
>
>
> >>>>>>> would
> >>>>>>> be right for you to kill a chicken who happened to be passing by
> >>>>>>> just
> >>>>>>> because you felt hungry, no.
> >>>>>> Why not? Isn't the hunger of a highly sentient being more important
> >>>>>> than
> >>>>>> the
> >>>>>> life of a marginally sentient one?
> >>>>> Not really, not when you can easily assuage your hunger in other ways.
> >>>> Why must I opt for those other ways when I prefer this way?
> >>> Well, the reason why you must, *according to preference
> >>> utilitarianism*, is clear. And my only purpose in this discussion has
> >>> been to explain what preference utilitarianism says. I am not trying
> >>> to defend it. That said, I think your choice of the more harmful meal
> >>> needs a bit more justification than just your taste preferences.
> >> Why? Nobody chooses the "least harmful meal" including you.
>
> > What of it? How does that cast any doubt on what I said?
>
> You said, "Not really, not when you can easily assuage your hunger in
> other ways."
>
> How am I obliged to choose other ways that are less preferable to me
> when everyone chooses options that are less than ideal?
>

Everyone choose options that are less than ideal, everyone also thinks
that there are some limitations on the amount of harm you are allowed
to cause. The question is where to draw the line.

> >> And that also
> >> misses the point that the chicken might be less harmful than other meals
> >> which you might prefer I eat.
>
> > Why would I prefer that you eat a more harmful meal?
>
> Based on your previous statement you very plausibly might prefer that I
> assuage my hunger by eating rice, beans, vegetables and fruit rather
> than the free-range chicken breast I prefer, regardless of the total
> harm resulting from the foods.

No. The total harm resulting from the foods is the primary moral
consideration.

> This might be based on your focus on the
> fact that the chicken is visible, it is killed directly and
> deliberately, whereas the harm caused by the other food is more easily
> ignored, justified, less definitive.
>

No. What I think is that people should make every reasonable effort to
minimize the total amount of harm caused. Some non-vegan diets might
be consistent with this.

> >> Why are you so intent on convicting me of
> >> immoral behaviour? What do you expect to gain by it?
>
> > Why are you incapable of grasping the fact that I have never once
> > accused you of immoral behaviour? I made a perfectly reasonable
> > statement. Are you interested in talking about my views or aren't you?
> > Will you please get over this absurd fixation on the supposed terrible
> > wrong of others accusing you of immoral behaviour. I'm here to talk
> > about ethics, not to help you evaluate your lifestyle. That's your
> > business.
>
> Sorry if I seem touchy, but when you say that I should not eat a chicken
> because I have other options that is a pretty harsh indictment of the
> choices I make.
>

It seems likely that the chicken you buy will have been produced in
ways that cause significantly more harm than is caused by the
production of other foods, such as most plant-based food. The benefit
which you obtain from eating the chicken over and above the benefit
you could obtain by eating less harmfully produced food seems fairly
trivial. So, is it justifiable? Well, you decide. I simply expressed
the view that some justification was needed. Seems like a pretty
reasonable view to me. No doubt you have given serious consideration
to the question of whether or not your behaviour is justified. It's
your business, not mine. I don't know what kind of chicken you buy and
I don't know how much crop input is required for chicken production. I
haven't formed a definitive opinion about your behaviour, which I
don't know very much about anyway, and I can't really say I'm all that
interested in the matter, I'm here to discuss animal ethics. If you
find it offensive that anyone would dare to suggest that your
behaviour might be morally questioned, then maybe an animal ethics
forum isn't the place for you. I really don't see how you can run an
animal ethics forum on the basis that nobody is allowed to express
opinions which entail that what other people are doing might be
morally wrong. You're prepared to morally condemn other people for
supporting dogfighting, for example.

If you really are upset about this and want to thrash it out, fine,
let's talk it over. You tell me what you eat, and we'll try to find
out as much as we can about how it was produced, and I'll offer any
opinions I may have about whether what you're doing is morally
justifiable. Maybe I'll think it is, maybe I won't. And if you don't
agree, that's fine. You can try to convince me that I'm wrong if you
like. I really don't see what you find so offensive. I have plenty of
very good friends and family members who know damn well that my moral
views entail that what they're doing is morally wrong, and it doesn't
bother them in the least. We agree to disagree. People might think
that various aspects of my lifestyle are morally wrong in some way for
various reasons, so long as they respect the fact that I've thought
seriously about the matter and hold a different opinion I really don't
see why it should stop us from getting on.
 >> Stay informed about: The myth of food production "efficiency" in the "ar" debate 

Rupert wrote:
> On Jul 5, 7:21 pm, "Dutch" <n... DeleteThis @home.com> wrote:

{..]

>>>>>>> would
>>>>>>> be right for you to kill a chicken who happened to be passing by
>>>>>>> just
>>>>>>> because you felt hungry, no.
>>>>>> Why not? Isn't the hunger of a highly sentient being more important
>>>>>> than
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> life of a marginally sentient one?
>>>>> Not really, not when you can easily assuage your hunger in other ways.
>>>> Why must I opt for those other ways when I prefer this way?
>>> Well, the reason why you must, *according to preference
>>> utilitarianism*, is clear. And my only purpose in this discussion has
>>> been to explain what preference utilitarianism says. I am not trying
>>> to defend it. That said, I think your choice of the more harmful meal
>>> needs a bit more justification than just your taste preferences.
>> Why? Nobody chooses the "least harmful meal" including you.
>
> What of it? How does that cast any doubt on what I said?

You said, "Not really, not when you can easily assuage your hunger in
other ways."

How am I obliged to choose other ways that are less preferable to me
when everyone chooses options that are less than ideal?

>> And that also
>> misses the point that the chicken might be less harmful than other meals
>> which you might prefer I eat.
>
> Why would I prefer that you eat a more harmful meal?

Based on your previous statement you very plausibly might prefer that I
assuage my hunger by eating rice, beans, vegetables and fruit rather
than the free-range chicken breast I prefer, regardless of the total
harm resulting from the foods. This might be based on your focus on the
fact that the chicken is visible, it is killed directly and
deliberately, whereas the harm caused by the other food is more easily
ignored, justified, less definitive.

>> Why are you so intent on convicting me of
>> immoral behaviour? What do you expect to gain by it?
>>
>
> Why are you incapable of grasping the fact that I have never once
> accused you of immoral behaviour? I made a perfectly reasonable
> statement. Are you interested in talking about my views or aren't you?
> Will you please get over this absurd fixation on the supposed terrible
> wrong of others accusing you of immoral behaviour. I'm here to talk
> about ethics, not to help you evaluate your lifestyle. That's your
> business.

Sorry if I seem touchy, but when you say that I should not eat a chicken
because I have other options that is a pretty harsh indictment of the
choices I make.


[..]

Most of this is covered in more recent threads.
 >> Stay informed about: The myth of food production "efficiency" in the "ar" debate 

Rupert wrote:
> On Jul 30, 7:27 am, Dutch <n....RemoveThis@email.com> wrote:
>> Rupert wrote:
>>> On Jul 5, 7:21 pm, "Dutch" <n....RemoveThis@home.com> wrote:
>> {..]
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>>>>>>> would
>>>>>>>>> be right for you to kill a chicken who happened to be passing by
>>>>>>>>> just
>>>>>>>>> because you felt hungry, no.
>>>>>>>> Why not? Isn't the hunger of a highly sentient being more important
>>>>>>>> than
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> life of a marginally sentient one?
>>>>>>> Not really, not when you can easily assuage your hunger in other ways.
>>>>>> Why must I opt for those other ways when I prefer this way?
>>>>> Well, the reason why you must, *according to preference
>>>>> utilitarianism*, is clear. And my only purpose in this discussion has
>>>>> been to explain what preference utilitarianism says. I am not trying
>>>>> to defend it. That said, I think your choice of the more harmful meal
>>>>> needs a bit more justification than just your taste preferences.
>>>> Why? Nobody chooses the "least harmful meal" including you.
>>> What of it? How does that cast any doubt on what I said?
>> You said, "Not really, not when you can easily assuage your hunger in
>> other ways."
>>
>> How am I obliged to choose other ways that are less preferable to me
>> when everyone chooses options that are less than ideal?
>>
>
> Everyone choose options that are less than ideal, everyone also thinks
> that there are some limitations on the amount of harm you are allowed
> to cause. The question is where to draw the line.

Shouldn't your focus be on your own line, not mine?

Not everyone thinks that they have figured out that 99% of the people in
the world have it wrong.

>
>>>> And that also
>>>> misses the point that the chicken might be less harmful than other meals
>>>> which you might prefer I eat.
>>> Why would I prefer that you eat a more harmful meal?
>> Based on your previous statement you very plausibly might prefer that I
>> assuage my hunger by eating rice, beans, vegetables and fruit rather
>> than the free-range chicken breast I prefer, regardless of the total
>> harm resulting from the foods.
>
> No. The total harm resulting from the foods is the primary moral
> consideration.

Not according to veganism which preaches "no animal products" as the
rule, particularly no meat. Unless the promoters of veganism believe in
one thing and preach something else. Is that possible?? :^\


>> This might be based on your focus on the
>> fact that the chicken is visible, it is killed directly and
>> deliberately, whereas the harm caused by the other food is more easily
>> ignored, justified, less definitive.
>>
>
> No. What I think is that people should make every reasonable effort to
> minimize the total amount of harm caused. Some non-vegan diets might
> be consistent with this.

They certainly would be if I happen to define unreasonable to include
abstaining from all animal products. And I do..

>>>> Why are you so intent on convicting me of
>>>> immoral behaviour? What do you expect to gain by it?
>>> Why are you incapable of grasping the fact that I have never once
>>> accused you of immoral behaviour? I made a perfectly reasonable
>>> statement. Are you interested in talking about my views or aren't you?
>>> Will you please get over this absurd fixation on the supposed terrible
>>> wrong of others accusing you of immoral behaviour. I'm here to talk
>>> about ethics, not to help you evaluate your lifestyle. That's your
>>> business.
>> Sorry if I seem touchy, but when you say that I should not eat a chicken
>> because I have other options that is a pretty harsh indictment of the
>> choices I make.
>>
>
> It seems likely that the chicken you buy will have been produced in
> ways that cause significantly more harm than is caused by the
> production of other foods, such as most plant-based food.

Does it now, show your evidence of this.

> The benefit
> which you obtain from eating the chicken over and above the benefit
> you could obtain by eating less harmfully produced food seems fairly
> trivial.

Not to me it doesn't. With regards to diet it is distinctly non-trivial.

> So, is it justifiable? Well, you decide. I simply expressed
> the view that some justification was needed.

To whom? I don't know of any ruling body that is requiring that we
provide any such justification, provided we are acting within the law.

> Seems like a pretty
> reasonable view to me.

It seems a little on the nosy side to me.

> No doubt you have given serious consideration
> to the question of whether or not your behaviour is justified.

Maybe I have, but it's my business. I'm not doing anything strange.

> It's
> your business, not mine. I don't know what kind of chicken you buy and
> I don't know how much crop input is required for chicken production. I
> haven't formed a definitive opinion about your behaviour, which I
> don't know very much about anyway, and I can't really say I'm all that
> interested in the matter, I'm here to discuss animal ethics. If you
> find it offensive that anyone would dare to suggest that your
> behaviour might be morally questioned, then maybe an animal ethics
> forum isn't the place for you.

What better place to express the opinion that within the law what I eat
is nobody else's business but mine, unless I choose to discuss it?

> I really don't see how you can run an
> animal ethics forum on the basis that nobody is allowed to express
> opinions which entail that what other people are doing might be
> morally wrong.

You're allowed to express that opinion, and I'm allowed to tell you to
mind your own business if you don't accept my reasonable response, which
is to tell you that we all cause harm to animals.

> You're prepared to morally condemn other people for
> supporting dogfighting, for example.

And they're free to tell me that my criticism is unwarranted if they dare.

> If you really are upset about this and want to thrash it out, fine,
> let's talk it over. You tell me what you eat, and we'll try to find
> out as much as we can about how it was produced, and I'll offer any
> opinions I may have about whether what you're doing is morally
> justifiable.

I'm not upset about it, and I'm not interested in having you review my
grocery purchases.

> Maybe I'll think it is, maybe I won't. And if you don't
> agree, that's fine. You can try to convince me that I'm wrong if you
> like. I really don't see what you find so offensive. I have plenty of
> very good friends and family members who know damn well that my moral
> views entail that what they're doing is morally wrong, and it doesn't
> bother them in the least. We agree to disagree. People might think
> that various aspects of my lifestyle are morally wrong in some way for
> various reasons, so long as they respect the fact that I've thought
> seriously about the matter and hold a different opinion I really don't
> see why it should stop us from getting on.

Real life acquaintances are a different matter. For reasons of social
harmony people will bite their tongues and not tell you what they really
think about your little sideways glances and obscure remarks designed to
make them feel slightly uncomfortable. Truth be told they probably wish
you would just blow away like a bad smell.
 >> Stay informed about: The myth of food production "efficiency" in the "ar" debate 

ANIMAL RIGHTS BILL 1 - Tom Regan speaks.
Video (8.38 minutes)
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ADhNch30Img
 >> Stay informed about: The myth of food production "efficiency" in the "ar" debate 

On Jul 30, 8:40 pm, Dutch <n....TakeThisOut@email.com> wrote:
> Rupert wrote:
> > On Jul 30, 7:27 am, Dutch <n....TakeThisOut@email.com> wrote:
> >> Rupert wrote:
> >>> On Jul 5, 7:21 pm, "Dutch" <n....TakeThisOut@home.com> wrote:
> >> {..]
>
> >>>>>>>>> would
> >>>>>>>>> be right for you to kill a chicken who happened to be passing by
> >>>>>>>>> just
> >>>>>>>>> because you felt hungry, no.
> >>>>>>>> Why not? Isn't the hunger of a highly sentient being more important
> >>>>>>>> than
> >>>>>>>> the
> >>>>>>>> life of a marginally sentient one?
> >>>>>>> Not really, not when you can easily assuage your hunger in other ways.
> >>>>>> Why must I opt for those other ways when I prefer this way?
> >>>>> Well, the reason why you must, *according to preference
> >>>>> utilitarianism*, is clear. And my only purpose in this discussion has
> >>>>> been to explain what preference utilitarianism says. I am not trying
> >>>>> to defend it. That said, I think your choice of the more harmful meal
> >>>>> needs a bit more justification than just your taste preferences.
> >>>> Why? Nobody chooses the "least harmful meal" including you.
> >>> What of it? How does that cast any doubt on what I said?
> >> You said, "Not really, not when you can easily assuage your hunger in
> >> other ways."
>
> >> How am I obliged to choose other ways that are less preferable to me
> >> when everyone chooses options that are less than ideal?
>
> > Everyone choose options that are less than ideal, everyone also thinks
> > that there are some limitations on the amount of harm you are allowed
> > to cause. The question is where to draw the line.
>
> Shouldn't your focus be on your own line, not mine?
>
> Not everyone thinks that they have figured out that 99% of the people in
> the world have it wrong.
>

99% of the people in the world haven't given any serious thought to
this issue at all, and know little or nothing about the way animals
are actually treated. They just continue doing what they are doing out
of habit, they're not interested in subjecting it to serious scrutiny.
Among people who have actually given the issue some serious thought,
your position is one reasonable one to take, my position is another
reasonable one to take, probably a position like mine is taken by
about as many people as those who take a position like yours. In any
case, argumentum ad populum is a pretty weak way of defending your
position.
>
>
> >>>> And that also
> >>>> misses the point that the chicken might be less harmful than other meals
> >>>> which you might prefer I eat.
> >>> Why would I prefer that you eat a more harmful meal?
> >> Based on your previous statement you very plausibly might prefer that I
> >> assuage my hunger by eating rice, beans, vegetables and fruit rather
> >> than the free-range chicken breast I prefer, regardless of the total
> >> harm resulting from the foods.
>
> > No. The total harm resulting from the foods is the primary moral
> > consideration.
>
> Not according to veganism which preaches "no animal products" as the
> rule, particularly no meat. Unless the promoters of veganism believe in
> one thing and preach something else. Is that possible?? :^\
>

People who believe that a vegan diet is morally obligatory believe
that the only way to minimize harm is to avoid all animal products.
You have offered criticism of this view, and as you know I accept that
it might be wrong, so I don't know why you are bringing up the views
of some other people in the context of this discussion. It's a dispute
about the facts, I really don't see why you are making such a big deal
out of it. Most vegan diets that people actually follow *are* better
than most non-vegan diets that people actually follow. As a general
rule of thumb, going vegan is a pretty reasonable strategy. There are
some other strategies which may be reasonable as well.


> >> This might be based on your focus on the
> >> fact that the chicken is visible, it is killed directly and
> >> deliberately, whereas the harm caused by the other food is more easily
> >> ignored, justified, less definitive.
>
> > No. What I think is that people should make every reasonable effort to
> > minimize the total amount of harm caused. Some non-vegan diets might
> > be consistent with this.
>
> They certainly would be if I happen to define unreasonable to include
> abstaining from all animal products. And I do..
>

Why? What's so unreasonable about it? Most people are able to be
perfectly healthy and happy and eat lots of delicious food while being
completely vegan.

>
>
>
>
> >>>> Why are you so intent on convicting me of
> >>>> immoral behaviour? What do you expect to gain by it?
> >>> Why are you incapable of grasping the fact that I have never once
> >>> accused you of immoral behaviour? I made a perfectly reasonable
> >>> statement. Are you interested in talking about my views or aren't you?
> >>> Will you please get over this absurd fixation on the supposed terrible
> >>> wrong of others accusing you of immoral behaviour. I'm here to talk
> >>> about ethics, not to help you evaluate your lifestyle. That's your
> >>> business.
> >> Sorry if I seem touchy, but when you say that I should not eat a chicken
> >> because I have other options that is a pretty harsh indictment of the
> >> choices I make.
>
> > It seems likely that the chicken you buy will have been produced in
> > ways that cause significantly more harm than is caused by the
> > production of other foods, such as most plant-based food.
>
> Does it now, show your evidence of this.
>

So you *do* want to talk about this? In other places in this post you
say it's none of my business and you're not interested in discussing
it.

My judgement was based on what I know about the way most chicken is
produced, and the level of crop input that most chicken requires. The
chicken you buy may be different for all I know, but given your
admission that you do buy factory-farmed meat when it's the only meat
you can find, I found that somewhat unlikely.

We can talk about it if you want to. You tell me what chicken you buy
and we'll try to find out how it was produced and make some sort of
estimate as to whether it causes more harm than most plant-based food.
Maybe it will turn out it doesn't, it was just a guess on my part. We
can try and work it out if you want to, if you're interested in
discussing the issue. I can't say I'm utterly fascinated.

> > The benefit
> > which you obtain from eating the chicken over and above the benefit
> > you could obtain by eating less harmfully produced food seems fairly
> > trivial.
>
> Not to me it doesn't. With regards to diet it is distinctly non-trivial.
>

Very interesting.

> > So, is it justifiable? Well, you decide. I simply expressed
> > the view that some justification was needed.
>
> To whom? I don't know of any ruling body that is requiring that we
> provide any such justification, provided we are acting within the law.
>

It's a view about the methodology of moral philosophy. I can't believe
I had to explain that. Do you want to talk about ethics or don't you?

If you don't think it's legitimate to suggest that any justification
is required beyond what is required by the current law, then what are
you doing in an ethics forum? For God's sake.

> > Seems like a pretty
> > reasonable view to me.
>
> It seems a little on the nosy side to me.
>

You were the one who brought up the issue of whether eating a chicken
is justifiable. In response I expressed the view that inflicting more
harm than was necessary required some justification. That's a very
reasonable view. If you find it an affront, if that strikes you as
"nosy", then that's utterly absurd, and an animal ethics forum is not
the place for you. The purpose of this forum is to discuss issues of
animal ethics, without interpreting every view that is expressed as a
personal attack.

> > No doubt you have given serious consideration
> > to the question of whether or not your behaviour is justified.
>
> Maybe I have, but it's my business.

Quite. Never suggested otherwise. I only wish we could stop talking
about it and actually get on with discussing some animal ethics.

> I'm not doing anything strange.
>
> > It's
> > your business, not mine. I don't know what kind of chicken you buy and
> > I don't know how much crop input is required for chicken production. I
> > haven't formed a definitive opinion about your behaviour, which I
> > don't know very much about anyway, and I can't really say I'm all that
> > interested in the matter, I'm here to discuss animal ethics. If you
> > find it offensive that anyone would dare to suggest that your
> > behaviour might be morally questioned, then maybe an animal ethics
> > forum isn't the place for you.
>
> What better place to express the opinion that within the law what I eat
> is nobody else's business but mine, unless I choose to discuss it?
>

That's not in question. However, usually when people come to an animal
ethics forum they have a desire to discuss something to do with animal
ethics. And you don't seem to be capable of doing that without getting
offended that anyone would dare to criticize your diet, even though no-
one actually has.

Animal ethics forums are for people who think critically about the way
we produce our food, who don't just assume that any choice within the
law is okay, who are prepared to subject it to critical discussion.
Most people are perfeclty happy to let you do whatever you want within
the law. Some people have formed views which are critical of the
status quo, and seek to persuade others of those views by reasoned
discussion and participation in the political process. It's bizarre
that you would seek out those people and tell them you're allowed to
do whatever you want, as if society somehow seriously called that into
question, as if you were somehow affronted by the views they'd
formed.

I've never expressed any interest in discussing your diet. Everytime I
make a statement about animal ethics it comes back to you. You seem to
*want* to discuss your diet. We can if you want. If you don't want to,
then can we please stop relating every statement I make back to you?
Just talk about the issues.

> > I really don't see how you can run an
> > animal ethics forum on the basis that nobody is allowed to express
> > opinions which entail that what other people are doing might be
> > morally wrong.
>
> You're allowed to express that opinion, and I'm allowed to tell you to
> mind your own business if you don't accept my reasonable response, which
> is to tell you that we all cause harm to animals.
>

Which is a stupid response. Just below we talk about people who
support dogfighting. If they made such a response it would be stupid,
I'm sure you agree.

> > You're prepared to morally condemn other people for
> > supporting dogfighting, for example.
>
> And they're free to tell me that my criticism is unwarranted if they dare.
>

Quite. And you are free to defend your diet if you choose to. Or,
alternatively, you can choose not to make it an issue.

> > If you really are upset about this and want to thrash it out, fine,
> > let's talk it over. You tell me what you eat, and we'll try to find
> > out as much as we can about how it was produced, and I'll offer any
> > opinions I may have about whether what you're doing is morally
> > justifiable.
>
> I'm not upset about it,

Then stop carrying on about it and get on with debating the real
issues.

> and I'm not interested in having you review my
> grocery purchases.
>

Good. Can't say I would have found the task all that fascinating
either.

> > Maybe I'll think it is, maybe I won't. And if you don't
> > agree, that's fine. You can try to convince me that I'm wrong if you
> > like. I really don't see what you find so offensive. I have plenty of
> > very good friends and family members who know damn well that my moral
> > views entail that what they're doing is morally wrong, and it doesn't
> > bother them in the least. We agree to disagree. People might think
> > that various aspects of my lifestyle are morally wrong in some way for
> > various reasons, so long as they respect the fact that I've thought
> > seriously about the matter and hold a different opinion I really don't
> > see why it should stop us from getting on.
>
> Real life acquaintances are a different matter. For reasons of social
> harmony people will bite their tongues and not tell you what they really
> think about your little sideways glances and obscure remarks designed to
> make them feel slightly uncomfortable. Truth be told they probably wish
> you would just blow away like a bad smell.

Here you are engaging in fantasizing about my social life without the
slightest reasonable way of knowing anything about it. Reminds me a
lot of Ball with his fantasies he makes up about people. You're also
projecting the way you were when you were an ethical vegetarian onto
me.

There are no "sideways glances and obscure remarks". I have lots of
very strong friendships with vegans and meat-eaters alike. My friends
and family all respect the seriousness with which I've studied ethics
and the commitment I've shown to putting my ideas into practice. Some
of them like to debate the matter with me, others are happy to live
and let live. None of them are offended in the least.

You say "real life acquaintances are a different matter". Well,
obviously that's true in some ways. For example, if Ball carried on in
real life the way he does here he'd probably get punched. He'd also be
universally derided and socially ostracized. He does it on here
because he can get away with it without it affecting his real-world
social life.

But, really, I don't see why the ordinary rules of real-life social
interaction shouldn't apply here, such as respecting people's right to
hold a different opinion, and treating each other with basic courtesy.
It's not reasonable to get offended just because someone else accepts
the ethical vegan position (or some approximation thereto). You're
making this all about you, carrying on as though you're the victim of
a personal attack just because other people have come to different
conclusions than you. And you've got the idea that all ethical vegans
are the way you were when you were an ethical vegetarian. It's absurd.
 >> Stay informed about: The myth of food production "efficiency" in the "ar" debate 

The argument from marginal cases states that humans ought to treat
marginal members of their own kind no differently than they treat
non-humans with similar cognitive abilities.

The first flaw in this argument is that assumes that cognitive abilities
are the only criteria for moral consideration, and that "kind" itself is
not one. This basic premise is not argued rigorously and is as Cohen
says, non-intuitive to most people. All species of animal consider
members of their own kind to be of special status. We should not hastily
disregard our own strong intuition to do so as well. It has served us
well as a species.

But set that aside for now and consider cognitive abilities only, that
is the set of abilities which include linguistic facility, and being a
moral actor with the ability to consider and take responsibility for
one's actions. This is admittedly a valid moral criterion. Wetlesen has
advanced the notion that capacities can be viewed as operative and
non-operative, and that non-operative abilities or "capabilities" are
the actual criteria, not operative abilities. This accounts for the
moral status of infants and people with temporary or partial cognitive
disabilities. As long as there exists at the least some prospect of the
individual exhibiting the abilities at some future date then he is
treated as if he had the operative abilities. It also accounts for the
fact that non-humans have been denied full moral status, since full
cognitive abilities have never been exhibited by a non-human.

That leaves the case of the severely and permanently cognitively
impaired person with no hope of improvement. To be in this class the
person would have to have no vestige of human capabilities, they have
the mental capacity of the family dog. This is certainly a rare and
extreme level of impairment. As such, is it reasonable to use their
impaired condition as a criterion for how we view non-human animals?
That seems to be a leap at best.

What other plausible reasons could there be for treating the person and
the dog differently? Strong emotional or familial feelings on the part
of other persons? A desire to avoid a euthanasia slippery slope?
Religious considerations? A feeling of responsibility towards an
unfortunate member of society? A bond with another of our kind? All
plausible as moral considerations.

The next question is, is the way we treat this person really
inconsistent with the way we treat the family dog? We treat both with
affection, care for them and provide for their needs as long as they live.

What substance remains of the argument from marginal cases? What would
be the ramifications of carrying it to it's logical conclusion? I think
it's time for proponents to stop demanding answers and start providing
them. Let's see a thorough examination of *all* human-animal relations
from the animal rights lobby, and a moratorium on finger-pointing and
demands that the rest of us disprove their theories.
 >> Stay informed about: The myth of food production "efficiency" in the "ar" debate 

On Mon, 30 Jul 2007 19:19:43 GMT, Dutch <no.RemoveThis@email.com> wrote:

>
>The argument from marginal cases states

Rupert already knows, and he's been very patiently
explaining it to you, so there was no need for you
to snip the entire discussion away to derail it like this
and dodge everything he put to you, nebbish.
 >> Stay informed about: The myth of food production "efficiency" in the "ar" debate 

Derek wrote:
> On Mon, 30 Jul 2007 19:19:43 GMT, Dutch <no RemoveThis @email.com> wrote:
>
>> The argument from marginal cases states
>
> Rupert already knows, and he's been very patiently
> explaining it to you, so there was no need for you
> to snip the entire discussion away to derail it like this
> and dodge everything he put to you, nebbish.

Nothing of substance to contribute as always huh Derek? Maybe a new
sock-puppet is in order..
 >> Stay informed about: The myth of food production "efficiency" in the "ar" debate 

Rupert wrote:
> On Jul 31, 5:19 am, Dutch <n....RemoveThis@email.com> wrote:
>> The argument from marginal cases states that humans ought to treat
>> marginal members of their own kind no differently than they treat
>> non-humans with similar cognitive abilities.
>>
>> The first flaw in this argument is that assumes that cognitive abilities
>> are the only criteria for moral consideration, and that "kind" itself is
>> not one. This basic premise is not argued rigorously and is as Cohen
>> says, non-intuitive to most people.
>
> Make up your mind. Are we talking about Cohen's attempted rebuttal or
> Wetlesen's attempted rebuttal?

I am presenting an argument comprised of a number of parts, and I am
identifying the references where applicable, do you have a problem with
that?

> Anyway, I don't agree. Cohen's "kind" argument is interesting, but I
> find it fairly non-intuitive that the moral status of a being somehow
> depends on what's typical for its kind, and I think most people would
> agree.

I don't know why you employ that tortured wording Rupert, the argument
is that simply "kind" is morally relevant, not "what's typical for its
kind". Saying it that way simply muddies the waters.

> Also, there are all sorts of problems with this idea, such as
> which kinds do we consider? Every being belongs to enormously many
> different kinds.

The "kind" we are talking about is obvious, species.

> And even if we assume that we can somehow identify a
> class of "natural kinds", there are still many apparent counter-
> examples to the general thesis that the moral status of a being
> depends on what's typical for its kind

There's that tortured phrasing again. *KIND*, Rupert, not "what's
typical for its kind".

> such as the chimpanzee who can
> do mathematics, or the fact that people who are mentally ill are
> usually not held responsible for their actions, although typical
> members of their kind are.

Wetlesen deals with this aspect of the argument.

>> All species of animal consider
>> members of their own kind to be of special status.
>
> We don't usually look to other animals for guidance about moral
> behaviour.

We reject our basic nature not without risk. When we look at other
animals we are seeing reflections of our own basic natures. I would have
thought you'd be in agreement with that.

>> We should not hastily
>> disregard our own strong intuition to do so as well. It has served us
>> well as a species.
>>
>
> We might once have said the same thing about race. The point is that
> judging the moral status of a being by what is typical for his or her
> species is counter-intuitive,

There's that tortured phrasing again. Species (kind) is morally
significant mainly in that it captures many characteristics in one fell
swoop.

> is contrary to what we do in many other
> cases, and needs justification. Such justification has not been
> forthcoming.

In this case it seems intuitively correct to most people for a host of
reasons, many of which are discussed by Wetlesen, and so should not be
discarded so easily. In fact we require a good reason from YOU to
discard them. It has not been forthcoming.

>
>> But set that aside for now and consider cognitive abilities only, that
>> is the set of abilities which include linguistic facility, and being a
>> moral actor with the ability to consider and take responsibility for
>> one's actions. This is admittedly a valid moral criterion. Wetlesen has
>> advanced the notion that capacities can be viewed as operative and
>> non-operative, and that non-operative abilities or "capabilities" are
>> the actual criteria, not operative abilities.
>
> But he's given no real clarification of the notion of a "non-operative
> ability".

If a neurobiologist described the specific brain mechanisms involved in
having the capabilities in question but not the abilities what
difference would that make to the argument? This seems very much like a
pretext to reject the argument rather than a valid objection.


>> This accounts for the
>> moral status of infants and people with temporary or partial cognitive
>> disabilities. As long as there exists at the least some prospect of the
>> individual exhibiting the abilities at some future date then he is
>> treated as if he had the operative abilities. It also accounts for the
>> fact that non-humans have been denied full moral status, since full
>> cognitive abilities have never been exhibited by a non-human.
>>
>> That leaves the case of the severely and permanently cognitively
>> impaired person with no hope of improvement. To be in this class the
>> person would have to have no vestige of human capabilities, they have
>> the mental capacity of the family dog. This is certainly a rare and
>> extreme level of impairment. As such, is it reasonable to use their
>> impaired condition as a criterion for how we view non-human animals?
>> That seems to be a leap at best.
>>
>
> It is clear that such a human has a high moral status.

Based on what? There are very few humans so radically impaired that they
lack any vestige or hope of awareness, while retaining brain function,
and for those few that do exist, empathy for their unfortunate condition
*alone* explains why we feel they way we do towards them.

> If anyone wants
> to give a dog a lower moral status, they have an obligation to give a
> justification for the differential pattern of judgement. That is the
> argument from marginal cases. It remains unanswered.

It doesn't remain unanswered, you continue to reject answers that you
don't want to hear.


>> What other plausible reasons could there be for treating the person and
>> the dog differently? Strong emotional or familial feelings on the part
>> of other persons? A desire to avoid a euthanasia slippery slope?
>> Religious considerations? A feeling of responsibility towards an
>> unfortunate member of society? A bond with another of our kind? All
>> plausible as moral considerations.
>>
>
> This is different to Wetlesen's argument.

If I simply intended to parse Wetelesen I would have chosen a different
subject line. Surely it's apparent by now that I am presenting a broader
perspective. Do you wish to limit the scope of my argument?

> If you want to pursue these
> lines of thought, go ahead.

Help me understand how a rhetorical remark like that gets left in. I can
understand thinking it, even typing it, but not to edit it out before
posting is confounding.

> But I don't think they are satisfactory
> because no-one thinks that the high moral status of the radically
> cognitively impaired human depends only on such considerations.

You don't know that. In fact I am quite sure that many people believe
something quite similar. Radically impaired humans are not granted moral
consideration based on their level of cognition, that is for sure. If
all humans were so unfortunate then there would be no such thing as
moral consideration, because it's one of the ideas unique to humans. For
this reason also the argument from marginal cases fails, because it
demands that we assume that level of cognition be the sole criterion for
moral consideration, and that simply is not the case, whether you
approve of it or not. For that reason we cannot take it as a premise for
the argument.

It
> goes deeper than that. In particular, the appeal to religious
> considerations is very weak. We're talking about secular ethics here.
> You're not religious yourself.

Hang on a second. You introduced by this argument the notion that we
need to explain why we treat radically impaired humans the way we do.
That makes every true reason valid, no matter whether you think that
reason is worthy or not. A reason is a reason if that is why it is done
and they all go to provide an answer to YOUR question. The answer to
your question is that ALL the reasons come into play. You can't set up a
so-called conundrum then reject the actual answer to it because it
doesn't suit you.

>> The next question is, is the way we treat this person really
>> inconsistent with the way we treat the family dog? We treat both with
>> affection, care for them and provide for their needs as long as they live.
>>
>
> But we would never think it permissible to treat the radically
> cognitively impaired human in some of the ways in which we often think
> it permissible to treat dogs.

I might take issue with that, but the fact is, humans are not dogs,
impaired or not, and there is no way or reason to impose our view of
other humans onto our view of dogs, no matter how much we may like dogs.


>> What substance remains of the argument from marginal cases?
>
> It remains unscathed and unanswered.

In your present state of mind I expect no other response.

>> What would
>> be the ramifications of carrying it to it's logical conclusion?
>
> Radical reform in our treatment of animals, but perfectly feasible.

Time to "put up or shut up", and stop making sweeping statements with
nothing to back them up.


>> I think
>> it's time for proponents to stop demanding answers and start providing
>> them. Let's see a thorough examination of *all* human-animal relations
>> from the animal rights lobby, and a moratorium on finger-pointing and
>> demands that the rest of us disprove their theories.
>
>
 >> Stay informed about: The myth of food production "efficiency" in the "ar" debate 

Rupert wrote:
> On Jul 30, 8:40 pm, Dutch <n....RemoveThis@email.com> wrote:
>> Rupert wrote:
>>> On Jul 30, 7:27 am, Dutch <n....RemoveThis@email.com> wrote:
>>>> Rupert wrote:
>>>>> On Jul 5, 7:21 pm, "Dutch" <n....RemoveThis@home.com> wrote:
>>>> {..]
>>>>>>>>>>> would
>>>>>>>>>>> be right for you to kill a chicken who happened to be passing by
>>>>>>>>>>> just
>>>>>>>>>>> because you felt hungry, no.
>>>>>>>>>> Why not? Isn't the hunger of a highly sentient being more important
>>>>>>>>>> than
>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>> life of a marginally sentient one?
>>>>>>>>> Not really, not when you can easily assuage your hunger in other ways.
>>>>>>>> Why must I opt for those other ways when I prefer this way?
>>>>>>> Well, the reason why you must, *according to preference
>>>>>>> utilitarianism*, is clear. And my only purpose in this discussion has
>>>>>>> been to explain what preference utilitarianism says. I am not trying
>>>>>>> to defend it. That said, I think your choice of the more harmful meal
>>>>>>> needs a bit more justification than just your taste preferences.
>>>>>> Why? Nobody chooses the "least harmful meal" including you.
>>>>> What of it? How does that cast any doubt on what I said?
>>>> You said, "Not really, not when you can easily assuage your hunger in
>>>> other ways."
>>>> How am I obliged to choose other ways that are less preferable to me
>>>> when everyone chooses options that are less than ideal?
>>> Everyone choose options that are less than ideal, everyone also thinks
>>> that there are some limitations on the amount of harm you are allowed
>>> to cause. The question is where to draw the line.
>> Shouldn't your focus be on your own line, not mine?
>>
>> Not everyone thinks that they have figured out that 99% of the people in
>> the world have it wrong.
>>
>
> 99% of the people in the world haven't given any serious thought to
> this issue at all, and know little or nothing about the way animals
> are actually treated.

You're engaging in the worst kind of intellectual snobbery. You don't
know any more about how animals are actually treated than the average
person on the street. In fact you have a perception based on Animal
Rights propaganda that is likely less accurate.

> They just continue doing what they are doing out
> of habit, they're not interested in subjecting it to serious scrutiny.

More snobbery and pretension, if vegans want to scrutinize they need to
start with their own food, there's lots of death and suffering there to
keep them in hand wringing for a few years at least.

> Among people who have actually given the issue some serious thought,
> your position is one reasonable one to take, my position is another
> reasonable one to take, probably a position like mine is taken by
> about as many people as those who take a position like yours.

You're kidding yourself, not that I really know what your position is,
but from what I can deduce, you're part of the 1%.

> In any
> case, argumentum ad populum is a pretty weak way of defending your
> position.

I didn't use argumentum ad populum to support my position, I am telling
you a fact to put in your pocket for future reference, you form part of
a tiny minority. I realize you probably think that is irrelevant at
worst, probably a good thing, being rather elitist in nature, as you
previous statements confirm, but to a rational person it would give pause.

And incidentally, talking about "argumentums", look up "argument ad
baculum", you use it constantly.

>>>>>> And that also
>>>>>> misses the point that the chicken might be less harmful than other meals
>>>>>> which you might prefer I eat.
>>>>> Why would I prefer that you eat a more harmful meal?
>>>> Based on your previous statement you very plausibly might prefer that I
>>>> assuage my hunger by eating rice, beans, vegetables and fruit rather
>>>> than the free-range chicken breast I prefer, regardless of the total
>>>> harm resulting from the foods.
>>> No. The total harm resulting from the foods is the primary moral
>>> consideration.
>> Not according to veganism which preaches "no animal products" as the
>> rule, particularly no meat. Unless the promoters of veganism believe in
>> one thing and preach something else. Is that possible?? :^\
>>
>
> People who believe that a vegan diet is morally obligatory believe
> that the only way to minimize harm is to avoid all animal products.
> You have offered criticism of this view, and as you know I accept that
> it might be wrong, so I don't know why you are bringing up the views
> of some other people in the context of this discussion. It's a dispute
> about the facts, I really don't see why you are making such a big deal
> out of it. Most vegan diets that people actually follow *are* better
> than most non-vegan diets that people actually follow. As a general
> rule of thumb, going vegan is a pretty reasonable strategy. There are
> some other strategies which may be reasonable as well.

I'm not going argue this point, except to say that if all that was being
touted was veganism is "a pretty reasonable strategy" not many of us
would f